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SAVINO v. MURRAY
82 F.3d 593 (4th Cir. 1996)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On the evening of November 29, 1988, Joseph John Savino killed
his lover, Thomas McWaters. Savino repeatedly beat McWaters in the
head with a hammer, but because he was unconvinced that his blows had
killed McWaters, Savino retrieved two knives from the kitchen and
stabbed McWaters' in the back and neck. Leaving the knives imbedded
in McWaters's boay, Savino stole one hundred dollars in cash and fled.
Savino was arrested the following day, and eventually admitted to police
that he had killed McWaters. 1
Savino pleaded guilty to capital murder and robbery charges.
Following three days of testimony at the penalty phase, the trial judge
found Savino to be a future danger and sentenced him to death. The
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Savino's conviction and sentence,
and the United States Supreme Court denied Savino's petition for writ of
2
certiorari.
Savino then filed a state habeas petition which the state circuit
court, after two evidentiary hearings, dismissed. The Supreme Court of
Virginia denied Savino's appeal, and the United States Supreme Court
3
again denied Savino's petition for writ of certiorari.
Raising fourteen separate claims, Savino filed a federal habeas
petition in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia. The district court dismissed the petition and denied Savino's
motion to amend or alter thejudgment. Savino appealed, challenging the
district court's decision with regard to only three claims: his "legal
representation, guilty plea and future dangerousness." 4

and will not be discussed at length here. Conversely, the court's rejection
of Savino's Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims regarding the use of
testimony by the Commonwealth's expert, Dr. Centor, has serious
implications for the defense of capital murders.
1.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Guilty Plea

Savino contended that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
inform him of other viable defenses before entering his guilty plea.
Specifically, Savino claimed counsel should have disclosed or pursued:
1) a challenge to the admissibility of his confession; 2) a challenge to the
robbery predicate of the capital murder statute; and, 3) an intoxication
defense. 8 The court found that none of the defenses were viable in the
particular circumstances of Savino's case. Accordingly, the court found
that counsel's assistance was constitutionally adequate. 9
It is important to note, however, that the court reaffirmed that a
defendant's expressed intention to plead guilty in no way relieves
defense counsel of his duty to "investigate possible defenses and to
advise the defendant so thathe can make an informed decision."1 0 Unless
counsel is certain that there is no reasonable probability that a potential
defense would succeed at trial, counsel must advise the client and pursue
such defenses. 11 Reasonable probability, as defined in Strickland v.
Washington,12 does not mean more likely than not. Rather, it means a
' 13
"probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
H. Mental Health Expert Testimony Regarding Future
14
Dangerousness

HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the decision of the district court. It found that defense counsel's assistance was not ineffective,5 Savino's guilty plea was knowing and
voluntary, 6 and the admission ofthe Commonwealth's expert testimony
in support of the future dangerousness aggravating factor did not violate
7
Savino's rights.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and propriety of guilty
pleas ordinarily turn on facts specific to each individual case. Accordingly, the court's rejection of these two claims contributes very little law

I Savino v. Murray,82 F.3d 593, 596-597 (4th Cir. 1996).
2 Id. at 597-598 (citations omitted).
3 Id. at 598 (citations omitted).
4 Id. (citations omitted).
5 Id. at 602.
6 Id. at 603.
7 Id. at 606.
8 Id. at 598-602.
9 Id. at 602.
10 Id. at 599 (citations omitted).
11 Id.
12 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
13 Id. at 694. Savino's guilty plea claim was rejected on the merits,

The most important part of the opinion is that concerning the
testimony of Dr. Centor, the Commonwealth's reciprocal expert, who
was appointed pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1. Dr. Centor
testified first at the penalty trial, as part of the Commonwealth's case in
chief, that Savino would likely be dangerous in the future. 15
Savino claimed that Dr. Centor's testimony was obtained and
presented in violation ofhis Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination andhis Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 16 Inrejecting Savino's
Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims, the court resolved one issue against
him about which reasonable people could differ, and then proceeded to
decide the remaining issues in a bizarre fashion, laying waste to common
sense and reason in its analysis ofprecedent and the plain language of Va.
Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1.

although the court also found it to be procedurally defaulted. The default
was upheld because the claim was not raised on direct appeal. Savino,
82 F.3d at 602. This finding may be correct, as it is a claim that the trial
court erred in accepting the guilty plea. However, it is doubtful that
Savino's appellate counsel, the same individuals who represented him at
trial, would have raised it. Hence, as Savino contended, this claim is akin
to an ineffective assistance of counsel argument. Id.
14
The characterization of the court's opinion in this section should
be attributed to William Geimer, Director of Virginia Capital Case
Clearinghouse, not the author.
15 Savino, 82 F.3d at 604.
16 Id. at 603.
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In Estelle v. Smith,17 the United States Supreme Court ruled that a
capital defendant who faces the results of a psychological evaluation as
evidence at the penalty stage is protected by both the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. 18 Not only is the defendant entitled under the Sixth
Amendment to "receive notice of the scope, nature and intended use of
the evaluation ' ' 19 but the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights require
that he receive a warning before the evaluation. 20 This warning must
inform the defendant that if he gives up his right to remain silent and
cooperates, "his statements to the evaluator may be used against him at
'21
the penalty phase.
Relying on Buchanan v. Kentucky,22 the court of appeals held that
when a "defendant asserts a mental status defense and introduces
psychiatric testimony in support of that defense, he may face rebuttal
'23
evidence from the prosecution taken from his own examination.
Thus, a defendant who asserts such a defense has "no Fifth Amendment
protection against the introduction of mental health evidence in rebuttal
to the defense's psychiatric evidence." 24
Buchanan dealt with the affirmative defense of extreme emotional
disturbance which, if made out, would have reduced a charge of murder
to manslaughter. 25 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1, however, concerns
presenting mitigating evidence at a capital penalty trial, an entirely
different context, which is supported by a long line of Supreme Court
precedent. 26 Simply put, mitigation in a capital sentencing proceeding is
not the same as presenting a "mental status defense," the situation in
Buchanan. The Court has never directly decided the latter issue.
Even if the court of appeals is correct, however, that a defendant's
notice of intent to introduce mental mitigation evidence under Va. Code
Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1 constitutes a waiver of his Fifth Amendment
privilege, the language remains overreaching: "it is clear that Savino
waived his Fifth Amendment rights by requesting a psychiatric evaluation pursuant to the applicable statute." 27 The language of the statute
itself belies this assertion. Under Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1, defen-

17
18
19
20
21
22
23

451 U.S. 454 (1981).
Id. at 471.
Id. at 470-471.
Id. at 462-463.
Savino, 82 F.3d at 603 (citations omitted).
483 U.S. 402 (1987).
Savino, 82 F.3d at 604 (citations omitted).
24 Id.
25 Buchanan, 483 U.S. at 408 & n.8, 423.
26 The Supreme Courthas heldthat the Eighth Amendment requires
that the jury in a capital case, must consider a wide range of mitigating
factors. See, Perryv. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319-328 (1989) (finding
error where trial court's instructions to the july did not allow jury to
consider as mitigating factor evidence of defendant's mental retardation
and childhood abuse); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112-116
(1982) (sentencing court's conclusion that it could not consider
defendant's turbulent family history as a mitigating factor in deciding
punishment was constitutional error); Lockettv. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,604
(1978) (requiring death penalty schemes to allow consideration "as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of defendant's character or record and any
of the circumstances of the offense that defendant proffers as a basis for
a sentence less than death"). Furthermore, the court's holding that a
defendant's stated intent to present expert testimony in mitigation
constitutes a complete waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights may well
be seen as a procedural barrier to the presentation of mitigation, something the Supreme Court has forbidden in other contexts. See, McKoyv.
North Carolina,494 U.S. 433,439-444 (1990) (striking down a North
Carolina statute that held that a mitigating factor can only be considered
if all jurors find it present because one juror can prevent others from

dants are entitled to request and receive an evaluation, and a report of it,
making use of it as they wish. If the defendant decides not to have the
expert testify at trial, the Commonwealth is not even entitled to a
reciprocal examination, much less one at which the accused has no Fifth
28
Amendment protection.
From that point, the opinion gets stranger. Although the court
acknowledged that defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to clear
29
notice of the scope and possible use of any reciprocal examination, it
cited the language of Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1 as satisfying this
requirement. 30 The statute says nothing about examinations relating to
future dangerousness. In fact, on its face, the statute purports to limit the
scope of the Commonwealth's reciprocal examination to factors present
at the time of the offense. 31 In Stewart v. Commonwealth,32 the Supreme
Court of Virginia found that the "order entered pursuant to the provisions
of the Code § 19.2-264.3:1 gave sufficient notice that the proposed
examination 'would be conducted by the Commonwealth's expert in an
effort to produce evidence against Savino's interest.' 33 Compare these
interpretations of the notice requirement with Estelle itself, where no
notice was found to have been given. In Estelle defense counsel was
aware that the trial court file contained a report by the state psychiatrist
referring to Smith as a"severe sociopath" but did not contain any specific
34
reference to future dangerousness.
Finally, to get around the fact that Dr. Centor was allowed to make
his future dangerouness prediction as part of the Commonwealth's case
in chief and not in rebuttal of defense mitigation evidence, the court, by
accident or design, neglected to discuss what the statute actually requires.
The Commonwealth is explicitly forbidden by Va. Code Ann. §
19.2-264.3:1(G) to establish an aggravating factor by use of any statements, or any evidence derived from statements, made by the defendant
during the reciprocal examination. Nonetheless, the court apparently
gave credence to Dr. Centor's questionable assertion that his opinion was
not based on statements made by Savino, but was instead formulated on

considering mitigating factor); Mills v. Maryland,486 U.S. 367,373-375
(1988) (holding Maryland death penalty sentencing instructions which a
reasonable juror could interpret as requiring unanimous findings by jury
on absence as well as presence of mitigating factors unconstitutional);
Green v. Georgia,442 U.S. 95,97 (1979) (finding exclusion ofevidence
at sentencing phase based upon Georgia's hearsay rule unconstitutional).
27 Savino, 82 F.3d at 604.
28 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(E) and (F).
29 Savino, 82 F.3d at 603. It is clear that in order to consult
effectively with his client, counsel must be advised of the scope and
nature of the Commonwealth's examination. Buchanan,483 U.S. at424.
30 Savino, 82 F.3d at 604.
31 Va Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(F) reads, in relevant part:
"If the attorney for the defendant gives notice pursuant to
subsection E and the Commonwealth thereafter seeks an
evaluation concerning the existence or absence of mitigating
circumstances relating to the defendant's mental condition
at the time of the offense the court shall appoint one or more
qualified experts to perform such an evaluation." (emphasis
added).
32 245 Va. 222, 427 S.E.2d 394 (1993).
33 Id. at 243,427 S.E.2d at 408 (quoting Savino v. Commonwealth,
239 Va. 534, 544, 391 S.E.2d 276, 281-282, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 882
(1990)).
34 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 456,458 (1981); See Case Summary
of Payne v. Netherland, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
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the basis of three factors: Savino's previous criminal history; the nature
of the crime; and, his history of substance abuse.35 However, when the
defense expert, Dr. Hovermale, was cross-examined by the Commonwealth, it was revealed that Dr. Centor's report contained statements
made by the defendant. Instead of addressing this fourth factor, evidence
that Dr. Centor was less than truthful about the source ofhis opinion, the
court simply ignored it. Finally, the court held that even if Dr. Centor's
testimony constituted error, it was harmless, speculating that excluding
Savino's statements would "probably have had little if any effect on Dr.
'36
Centor's assessment.

Because the court's analysis of Savino's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights regarding the use of the Commonwealth's mental health
expert testimony concerning future dangerous is erroneous, defense
counsel must preserve these issues. Unless and until the United States
Supreme Court reverses, counsel must give serious consideration to this
strategy: using a mental health expert but precluding him or her from
testifying at trial, even if the defendant's sanity or competency is in
37
question.

Summary and Analysis by:
C. Cooper Youell, IV

35 Savino, 82 F.3d at 605.
36 Id. at 605-606.
37 See Case Summary of Payne v. Netherland, Capital Defense
Journal, this issue (where a competency evaluation was used against a

defendant before the enactment of Va Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1.) See
also; Collica, Alice in WonderlandInterpretations:Rethinking the Use
of MentalMitigation Experts, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.

TUGGLE v. NETHERLAND
79 F.3d 1386 (4th Cir. 1996)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
In 1984, Lem Tuggle was convicted of capital murder committed
during or subsequent to a rape.1 He was sentenced to death after the jury
found the Commonwealth had proven both the future dangerousness and
vileness aggravating factors. Tuggle's conviction and sentence were
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Virginia on direct appeal.2 The United
States Supreme Court vacated Tuggle's sentence and remanded the case
for reconsideration in light of Ake v. Oklahoma,3 which had held that
when the prosecution presents psychiatric evidence to prove future
dangerousness, due process requires that an independent psychiatrist
4
also be appointed to assist the defense.
On remand, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial court
had indeed violated Ake by denying Tuggle an independent psychiatrist
to rebut the prosecution's psychiatric evidence of future dangerousness
during the sentencing phase.5 However, the Supreme Court of Virginia
reaffirmed Tuggle's death sentence. Relying on Zant v. Stephens,6 the
court reasoned that because the vileness factor was separately found by
the jury in addition to future dangerousness, the vileness factor alone was
7
sufficient to sustain the sentence.
Tuggle subsequently filed and was denied a petition for writ of
certiorari,8 a petition for state habeas relief, and a third petition for
certiorari.9 Tuggle then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in United
States District Court, and the district court granted relief on several

I Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(5) (Supp. 1995).
2 Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 493, 323 S.E.2d 539 (1984)
(Tuggle I).
3470 U.S. 68 (1985).
4 Id. at 83.
5 Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 99, 334 S.E.2d 838 (1985)
(Tuggle II).
6462 U.S. 862 (1983).
7 Tuggle, 230 Va. at 108-11, 334 S.E.2d at 844-46.
8 Tuggle v. Virginia,478 U.S. 1010 (1986).
9 Tuggle v. Bair,503 U.S. 989 (1992).

grounds, including Ake. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
reversed and remanded, agreeing with the Supreme Court of Virginia
that Tuggle's death sentence was valid underZant. 10 The United States
Supreme Court, however, granted certiorariand vacated the judgment of
the court of appeals.11 The Supreme Court noted that whileZanthad held
that an invalid aggravating circumstance does not always invalidate a
death sentence, the presence of an otherwise valid aggravator cannot
excuse the unconstitutional admission or exclusion of evidence. Thus,
while the Court was willing to assume that theAke error had no influence
upon thejury's finding of"vileness," the Court was not willing to assume
that the Ake constitutional error had no effect on the jury's ultimate
decision on whether to impose a life sentence or the death penalty.
Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for a
12
determination of whether harmless error analysis was applicable.
HOLDING
On remand, the Fourth Circuit held that the Ake error was "trial
error," as opposed to structural error, and therefore was subject to
harmless-error analysis. 13 The court of appeals further concluded that
federal habeas courts must apply the Brecht standard of harmlessness,
which requires a court to find that the error had a "substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict" before it
14
can grant relief.

10

Tuggle v. Thompson, 57 F.3d 1356, 1374 (4th Cir. 1995).
Tuggle v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. 283 (1995).
12
Id.at 285.
13
Tuggle v. Netherland, 79 F.3d 1386, 1391 (4th Cir. 1996).
14 Brecht v. Abramson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). In Brecht, the
Supreme Court concluded that granting federal collateral relief upon a
mere "reasonable possibility" that the error contributed to the verdict
would be inconsistent with the historic purpose of habeas corpus to
afford relief only to those who have been "grievously wronged" by
society. Id. at 637.
11

